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.rJ' FIRST SECTION 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia. - June 28-29, 1971 
1. Partridge was injured while operating his automobile at 
night in Rockbridge County, Virginia, as the result of a collision 
with an automobile operated by Dove. The collision occurred when 
Partridge made a left turn into a private roadway a.s Dove was 
attempting to pass him. In an action by Partridge against Dove 
seeking recovery for personal injuries, the sole issue of Dove's 
negligence was based on whether or not Dove had his headlights 
burning and.blew his horn as he attempted to pass Partridge. 
Dove testified that he had turned on his headlights 30 
minutes before the accident and he knew they were on at the time 
.· f the accident as he saw the reflection as they lighted up 
.utomobiles, including Partridge 1 s, as he approached them. Dove 
so testified that he blew his horn three times immediately 
ior to the collision. 
Partridge testified that he did not notice any lights on 
e's automobile and did not remember any horn blown and that 
first time he was aware of Dove's automobile was when it was 
ngside of him as he commenced his turn. 
Witness Robin testified that he was sitting in his automobile 
h was parked on the private roadway about 100 feet from and 
ng the highway on which Partridge and Dove were traveling and 
listening to his radio, which was not turned loud, while he 
aiting for a friend; that he heard no horn blow and saw no 
s on Dove's car and was made aware of the vehicles by the 
of the collision. It was shown that a sound of a horn such 
ve's could be heard for more than 100 feet . 
.. itness Wren testified that he was traveling 300 feet behind 
"J.dge, that Dove passed him and started to pass Partridge,. 
at he saw Dove's lights and heard his horn blow just prior 
collision. 
the conclusion of the above evidence, Dove's counsel 
o strike plaintiff's evidence and grant summary judgment 
round that the evidence as to the only issue involved 
as a matter of law, that Dove's lights were on and that 
was blown. The court ruled that there was sufficient 
by the testimony of Partridge and Robin to create a 
onflict a.s to this issue and submitted tbe same to the 
appropriate instructions. 
id the court commit error in overruling defendant's 
n and submitting the issue to the jury? 
... ·· 
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2. Goodfellow was killed when a car driven by Jones, in · 
which Goodfellow was riding as a passenger, collided with a car 
driven by Whiz. Strange, driving a. third car, collided with the 
Whiz vehicle after the initial impact. 
Goodfellow's personal representative brought an action 
against Whiz and Strange, alleging that Goodfellow's death was 
the proximate result of their joint and several negligence. 
During the trial of this action, Officer Trueblood testified that 
after the accident, Strange stated to him that she had been trav-
eling east on the highway, approximately three car-lengths behind 
Whiz and that she estimated her speed, and that of Whiz, was 
about 60 miles an hour. 
Cary, a witness to the accident, testified that Strange told 
him after tl:le accident that she and Whiz were traveling at 65 
miles an hour. 
Strange, upon taking the stand, testified as to various 
;facts concerning the accident and stated that she and Whiz were 
;<:>nly going 4o to 50 miles per hour before the accident and she 
. ad been following Whiz at a distance of approximately four car-
engths. On cross-examination, she stated that she did not 
.ecall what she had told Officer Trueblood and did not remember 
·· eing or talking to Cary after the accident. Whiz also testified 
t Strange was traveling 45 to 50 miles per hour. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court struck the 
intiff's evidence as to Strange on the ground that any conduct 
her part had not been shown to be a proximate cause of Good-
low' s death. Thereupon, counsel for Whiz moved the court to 
ke the testimony of Officer Trueblood and Cary respecting 
:l1ge 's statements about the speed of Strange' s and Whiz 1 s 
cles prior to the accident and to instruct the jury to 
~gard such testimony on the ground that since Strange was 
nger a party to the action, the statements, originally only 
Sible against the defendant Strange as an admission against 
~st, were only hearsay evidence as to the defendant Whiz. 
How should the court rule on this motion? 
Farmer Green consults his attorney and advises him: 
egheny Manufacturing Company discharges the effluent from 
facturing plant into Mill Creek, a stream that flows 
Green's property; that the chemicals in the effluent 
,he water and render it unsafe for livestock to drink; 
stream, as a result of the discharge of the effluent 
gives off noxious odors that permeate the atmosphere 
n's property as well as over adjacent prqperty; that as 
.o:r the discharge of the effluent into the stream the 
1ue of Green's property has been substantially reduced; 
the defendant has threatened to continue the use of the 
r the discharge of its effluent for as long as the plant 
ng. Green requests his attorney to commence a suit to 
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enjoin Allegheny from continuing the discharge of its effluent· 
into the stream and to award Green damages for the losses sus-
tained by him. Green's attorney advises him that he would insti-
tute a suit in equity for an injunction and to recover damages. 
Green states to his attorney that he is anxious to have a jury 
hear the case. 
(1) What must Green's attorney do to commence a 
suit in equity? 
(2) May Green obtain a temporary injunction prior 
to a hearing of the case on its merits? 
(3) May Green have a jury hear the case? 
4. Apple Pie sued Peach Cobbler in the Circuit Court of 
Clarke County, Virginia_, to recover damages for a breach of con-
tract. The case was tried before a jury and the Court entered a 
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict of the jury. 
(1) Within what period of time must counsel for 
Peach Cobbler file a Petition for Appeal? 
-
(2) With whom may the Petition for Appeal be filed? 
(3) Within what period of time should counsel for 
Peach Cobbler file a Notice of Appeal and 
Assignments of Error? 
(4) What parts of the record must be designated by 
counsel for Peach Cobbler for printing? 
5. Defendant Rose was properly indicted on a charge of 
larceny. On the day of trial_, the jury was empanelled 
worn, and as the first prosecution witness took the stand 
efore he testified or was even asked his name, the Common-
~' s Attorney suddenly realized that one witness he needed 
not be available for two weeks, and accordingly, the . 
. wealth's Attorney moved to nolle=prosequi this action against 
endant. Defendant's counsel-opposed this motion. The · 
however, entered the nolle-prosequi. and dismissed the 
ent without the defendant's consent. Several weeks later, 
endant was indicted for the same crime, and at the trial 
case, defendant's attorney, having filed a special plea of 
is acquit_, moved the court to dismiss the indictment on 
s t at the defendant had been placed in jeopardy 
~y and to try him on this charge would constitute double 
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6. Marty Motorist brought an action at law in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia, against Ace Co., Ltd.,, 
and Danny Driver for injuries sustained by Marty Motorist as the 
result of an automobile accident. The body of the motion for 
judgment alleged as follows: 
111. That on May 1, 1971, the undersigned plain-
tiff was lawfully operating his automobile on Fifth 
Street in the city of Hampton, Virginia. 
112. That you, Danny Driver, while acting as agent 
of Ace Co., Ltd., and while acting in the course of, 
and within the scope of, said agency, did negligently 
operate and control an automobile owned by the said 
Ace Co., Ltd. 
11 3. That as the sole proximate result of your 
negligence, you did cause the said automobile to run 
into and collide with the automobile being operated 
by the plaintiff. 
"4. That as a result of the said negligence of you, 
and each of you, and the collision, the undersigned 
plaintiff did sustain injuries and damages to his per-
son in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars (~5,000). 
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves for jud~ment a?iainst 
you, and each of you, for the sum of $5,000. ' 
president of Ace Co., Ltd., having been served on May 5? 
~' brings the suit papers to you on May 10, 1971 and advises 
Ace does not own a motor vehicle, that it does not know .nor 
t ever employed Danny Driver, and that it has no knowledge 
e facts alleged in the motion for judgment. 
(a) What pleading or pleadings should you file 
on behalf of Ace Co., Ltd.? 
(b) Within what time must such pleading or pleadings 
be filed? 
Should such pleading or pleadings be under oath? 
What procedure should .you follow to effect 
filing and service of any pleading? 
Ladd brought an action at law in the Circuit Court of 
~ounty against Prince for personal injuries allegedly 
.~. in an automobile accident occurring on July 1, 1970 . 
.. service was obtained on Prince on December 1, 1970, but 
owing that he was not at fault since his vehicle was 
ill when struck in the rear by Ladd's vehicle, took no 
lying on the inherent fairness of the legal system. 
r 23, 1970, Ladd's lawyer appeared before the court 
Vin~ notice to Prince and moved the court to enter 





at that time to substantiate the amount of damages suffered by. 
Ladd. The judge, realizing that Ladd was not seriously injured, 
suggested that Lawyer take the treating physician's deposition 
so that the amount of damages could be ascertained. Lawyer then 
filed a notice with the clerk to take the doctor's deposition 
but, a.gain, did not give Prince notice of the taking of said 
deposition. Prince did not appear and had no opportunity to 
cross-examine the physician, thus enabling Ladd's Lawyer to 
.establish through the deposition that Ladd sustained damages 
in the amount of $20,000. La.wyer, for Ladd, a.gain appeared before 
the court, with the deposition filed, and without giving notice to 
Prince moved the court for judgment against Prince, based on the 
deposition. The court entered a judgment in favor of Ladd against 
Prince for $20,000 on January 3, 1971. Prince's bank account was 
attached on March 15, 1971, and needless t9 say, Prince became 
quite upset_ about the legal system and comes to you the next day 
and inquires as to what can be done for him. 
What should you advise? 
8. Sligo Insurance Company, a New York corporation with its 
incipal office in Ithaca, New York, executed, as surety, a pay-
nt and performance bond with Colwell, a. contractor and citizen 
Virginia, as principal. The bond ran to the City of Virginia 
a.ch, as obligee, on a contract of Colwell for building an 
ditorifun for the city, the same to be completed by September 15, 
O. Colwell encountered financial difficulties and defaulted 
the partially completed contract in June of 1970, and as a 
ult, Sligo paid to the city $200,000 for its cost of completing 
contract and $100,000 to various subcontractors for work done 
he job for which Colwell had not made payment. 
Sligo filed a complaint in the u. S. District Court for the 
rn District of Virginia on October 1, 1970 against Colwell 
ng, pursuant to the terms of the bond, reimbursement of the 
000 thus paid. After a hotly contested trial, on March 5, 
the court ruled that Sligo should have paid only $150,000 
bond and judgment in that amount was entered for Sligo 
t Colwell for reimbursement. 
Ma.y 1, 1971, Colwell filed .a complaint against Sligo in 
S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
tst count seeking a recovery of $12,000 on the ground that 
d overcharged this amount on the premium on the bond, 
ly Paid, and the second count seeking a recovery of 
for damage to Colwell's reputation and credit resulting 
nder and malicious threats of ruin and disgrace made by 
.agents during June and July, 1970 in an attempt to get 
"to post additional security on another job being done 
ity of Petersburg, Virginia, on which Sl:i.go was also 
o filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the complaint 
.und that Colwell was now precluded from asserting such 
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claims since he did not do so in the prior action. 
How should the court rule on the motion? 
9. While operating his automobile on the streets of the 
City of Portsmouth, Virginia, on January 13, 1971, Johnson was 
involved in a collision with a vehicle owned and operated by 
Simms. The damage to Johnson's vehicle was repaired for the . 
sum of $150, and Johnson initiated an action in the Municipal 
court of the City of Portsmouth seeking recovery of property 
amage to his vehicle in this amount. On February 12, 1971, 
he case was tried with both parties testifying, and the court 
ntered judgment in favor of Johnson for $150. This judgment 
as paid by Simms' insurance carrier. At the time of the acci-
ent, Simms.experienced only minor physical aches, which disap-
.eared shortly thereafter, but several months later, it devel.oped 
t the accident had caused his neck and back severe damage, and 
May of 1971, Simms was partially paralyzed. On May 1, 1971, 
s brought an action at law in the Circuit Court of the City 
Portsmouth to recover from Johnson the sum of $100,000 for 
sonal injuries, alleging the same was caused by Johnson's 
ligence in the automobile accident of January 13, 1971. 
son's attorney filed grounds of defense denying negligence, 
case was tried, and the jury returned a verdict for $25,000 
tavor of Simms, on which verdict judgment was entered. A 
t.h later, but before this judgment was paid, Johnson was 
ussing the case with his attorney and, for the first time, 
oned the $150 judgment which he had obtained in the Municipal 
for damage to his automobile. Johnson's attorney thereupon 
tly moved the court to set aside the judgment on the ground 
the doctrine of res judicata applied a.s the prior action in 
icipal Court between Johnson and Simms conclusively 
ished that Simms was negligent and Johnson was free from 
and accordingly barred the cause of action subsequently 
ed by Simms against Johnson for personal injuries. On 
pt, Simms contended (a) that the doctrine of res judicata 
~pplicable because the property damage action had been in 
· not of record and, therefore, had no effect upon the 
:1 injury action in the court of record; (b) that res . 
a was not applicable, in any event, as one action was for 
Y damage and the other for personal injury; (c) that even -
.cfoctrine of res judicata was applicable, the same had been 
Y Johnson failing to raise the point in the personal 
,.ction of Simms; and ( d) that the judgment was .final and 
t be disturbed in any event. 
the court rule as to each contention 
Alfred Arnold is a resident of Clifton Forge, Virginia 
J;026 acres of timber land in Summers county, West 
John Clifton is a resident of Salem, Virginia. Imme-
er cruising the timberland, and while still upon it, 
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on April 15, 1971 Arnold and Clifton entered into a valid written 
contract by which Arnold agreed to convey the land to Clifton for 
$20,520, the deed to be given and the purcha.se price to be paid 
on May 15, 1971. On May 15th, Clifton tendered to Arnold in the 
City of Clifton Forge the purchase price, but Arnold refused to 
execute and deliver the deed to the timberland. Shortly after 
leaving the office of Arnold, Clifton learned from a business 
associate of Arnold that Arnold was busily engaged in causing 
the cutting and removal of timber from the land. The next day 
Clifton brought a suit in equity against Arnold in the Circuit 
court of the City of Clifton Forge. Clifton's bill of complaint, 
after reciting the foregoing facts, sought relief on two grounds, 
(a) that the Court require Arnold to execute a deed conveying 
··. he timberland to Clifton on payment of the purchase price which 
t;ts tendered into Court with the bill, and (b) that Arnold be 
oined against further removal of timber from the land. Arnold 
s demurred.to the bill of complaint on the following two grounds: 
) the Virginia Court has no jurisdiction to compel him to convey 
Clifton the land situated in Summers County, West Virginia, and 
the Virginia Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin him against 
oving timber from the West Virginia land. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of 
Arnold's demurrer? 
.: .. • 
FIRST DAY FIRST SECTION 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - June 28-29, 1971 
1. Partridge was injured while operating his automobile at ,,.. 
night in Rockbridge County, Virginia, as the result of a collision 
with an automobile operated by Dove. The collision occurred when 
Partridge made a left turn into a private roadway as Dove was 
attempting to pass him. In an action by Partridge against Dove 
seeking recovery for personal injuries, the sole issue of Dove's 
negligence was based on whether or not Dove had his headlights 
burning and.blew his horn as he attempted to pass Partridge. 
Dove testified that he had turned on his headlights 30 
minutes before the accident and he knew they were on at the time 
of the accident as he saw the reflection as they lighted up 
automobiles, including Partridge's, as he approached them. Dove 
also testified that he blew his horn three times immediately 
prior to the collision. 
Partridge testified that he did not notice any lights on 
ve's automobile and did not remember any horn blown and that 
e first time he was aware of Dove's automobile was when it was 
ongside of him as he commenced his turn. 
Witness Robin testified that he was sitting in his automobile 
ch was parked on the private roadway about 100 feet from and 
ing the highway on which Partridge and Dove were traveling and 
listening to his radio, which was not turned loud, while he 
waiting for a friend; that he heard no horn blow and saw no 
ts on Dove's car and was made aware of the vehicles by the 
e of the collision. It was shown that a sound of a horn such 
ove's could be heard for more than 100 feet. 
Witness Wren testified that he was traveling 300 feet behind 
ridge, tha.t Dove passed him and started to pass Partridge, 
hat he saw Dove's lights and heard his horn blow just prior 
e collision. · " 
~t the conclusion of the above evidence, Dove's counsel 
to strike plaintiff's evidence and grant summary judgment. 
ground that the evidence as to the only issue involved 
~ as a matter of law, that Dove's lights were on and that 
rn was blown. The court ruled that there was sufficient 
e by the testimony of Partridge and Robin to create a 
conflict a.s to this issue and submitted the same to the 
th appropriate instructions. 
~id the court commit error in overruling defendant's 
ion and submitting the issue to the jury? 
.:_ .. 
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2. Goodfellow was killed when a car driven by Jones, in 
which Goodfellow was riding as a passenger, collided with a car 
driven by Whiz. Strange, driving a third car, collided with the 
Whiz vehicle after the ini tia.l impact. 
Goodfellow's personal representative brought an action 
against Whiz and Strange, alleging that Goodfellow's death was 
the proximate result of their joint and several negligence. 
During the trial of this action, Officer Trueblood testified that 
after the accident, Strange stated to him that she had been trav-
eling east on the highway, a.pproximately three car-lengths behind 
Whiz and that she estimated her speed, and that of Whiz, was 
about 60 miles an hour. 
Cary, a witness to the accident, testified that Strange told 
him after the accident that she and Whiz were traveling at 65 
miles an hour. 
Strange, upon taking the stand, testified as to various 
acts concerning the accident and stated that she and Whiz were 
nly going 4o to 50 miles per hour before the accident and she 
ad been following Whiz at a distance of approximately four car-
ngths. On cross-examination, she stated that she did not 
ecall what she had told Officer Trueblood and ·did not remember 
eing or talking to Cary after the accident. Whiz also testified 
at S_tra.,nge was traveling 45 to 50 miles per hour. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court struck the 
intiff's evidence as to Strange on the ground that any conduct 
her part had not been shown to be a proximate cause of Good-
.. ow' s death. Thereupon, counsel for Whiz moved the court to 
e the testimony of Officer Trueblood and Cary respecting 
ge's statements about the speed of Strange's and Whiz's 
les prior to the accident and to instruct the jury to 
gard such testimony on the ground that since Strange was 
ger a party to the action, the statements, originally only 
ible against the defendant Strange a.s an admission against 
·st, were only hearsay evidence as to the defendant Whiz. 
How should the court rule on this motion? 
. Farmer Green consults his attorney and advises him: 
legheny Manufacturing Company discharges the effluent from 
facturing plant into Mill Creel\., a stream that flows 
;Green's property; that the chemicals in the effluent 
e water and render it unsafe for livestock to drink; 
stream, as a result of the discharge of the effluent 
gives off noxious odors that permeate the atmosphere 
n's property as well as over adjacent pro.perty; that as 
Pf the discharge of the effluent into the stream the 
lue of Green's property has been substantially reduced; 
the defendant has threatened to continue the use of the 
r
1 
... the discharge of its effluent for as long as the plant 
ng. Green requests his attorney to commence a suit to 
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enjoin Allegheny from continuing the discharge of its effluent 
into the stream a.nd to award Green damages for the losses sus-
tained by him. Green's attorney advises him that he would insti-
tute a suit in equity for an injunction and to recover damages. 
Green states to his attorney that he is anxious to have a jury 
hear the case. 
(1) What must Green's attorney do to commence a 
suit in equity? 
(2) May Green obtain a temporary injunction prior 
to a hearing of the case on its merits? 
(3) May Green have a jury hear the case? 
4. Apple Pie sued Peach Cobbler in the Circuit Court of 
Clarke County, Virginia, to recover damages for a breach of con-
tract. The case was tried before a jury and the Court entered a 
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict of the jury. 
(1) Within what period of time must counsel for 
Peach Cobbler file a Petition for Appeal? 
(2) With whom may the Petition for Appeal be filed? 
(3) Within what period of time should counsel for 
Peach Cobbler file a Notice of Appeal and 
Assignments of Error? 
(4) What parts of the record must be designated by 
counsel for Peach Cobbler for printing? 
5. Defendant Rose was properly indicted on a charge of 
larceny. On the day of trial, the jury was empanelled 
orn, and as the first prosecution witness took the stand 
fore he testified or was even asked his name, the Common-
. 's Attorney suddenly realized that one witness he needed 
not be available for two weeks, and accordingly, the 
:weal th' s Attorney moved to nolle-prosequi this action against 
fendant. Defendant's c~unsei.opposed this motion. The . 
however, entered the nolle-proseg,ui and dismissed the 
ent without the defendant's consent. Several weeks later, 
ndant was indicted for the same crime, and at the trial 
case, defendant's attorney, having filed a special plea of 
is acquit, moved the court to dismiss the indictment on 
.< ds t at the defendant had been placed in jeopardy 





6. Marty Motorist brought an action at law in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia, against Ace Co., Ltd.,· 
and Danny Driver for injuries sustained by Marty Motorist as the 
result of an automobile accident. The body of the motion for 
judgment alleged as follows: 
111. That on May 1, 1971, the undersigned plain-
tiff was lawfully operating his automobile on Fifth 
Street in the city of Hampton, Virginia. 
112. That you, Danny Driver, while acting as agent 
of Ace Co., Ltd,, and while acting in the course of, 
and within the scope of, said agency, did negligently 
operate and control an automobile owned by the said 
Ace Co., Ltd. 
11 3. That as the sole proximate result of your 
negligence, you did cause the said automobile to run 
into and collide with the automobile being operated 
by the plaintiff. 
"4. That as a result of the said negligence of you, 
and each of you, and the collision, the undersigned 
plaintiff did sustain injuries and damages to his per-
son in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000). 
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves for jud~ment a~ainst 
you, and each of you, for the sum of $5,000. ' 
e president of Ace Co., Ltd., having been served on May 5, 
l, brings the suit papers to you on May 10, 1971 and advises 
t Ace does not own a motor vehicle, that it does not know nor 
it ever employed Danny Driver, and that it has no knowledge 
the facts alleged in the motion for judgment. 
(a) What pleading or pleadings should you file 
on behalf of Ace Co., Ltd.? 
(b) Within what time must such pleading or pleadings 
be filed? 
(c) Should such pleading or pleadings be under oath? 
(d) What procedure should .you follow to effect 
filing and service of any pleading? 
Ladd brought an action at law in the Circuit Court of 
County against Prince for personal injuries allegedly 
~d in an automobile accident occurring on July 1, 1970. 
l service was obtained on Prince on December 1, 1970, but 
knowing that he was not at fault since his vehicle was 
still when struck in the rear by Ladd's vehicle, took no 
relying on the inherent fairness of the legal system. 
ber 23, 1970, Ladd's lawyer appeared before the court 
~ivin~ notice to Prince and moved the court to enter 
·for :filOO ,,ooo, the amount sued for, but had no evidence. 
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at that time to substa.ntiate the amount of damages suffered by, 
Ladd. The judge, realizing that Ladd was not seriously injured, 
suggested that La.wyer take the treating physician's deposition 
so that the amount of damages could be ascertained. Lawyer then 
filed a notice with the clerk to take the doctor's deposition 
but, again, did not give Prince notice of the taking of said 
deposition. Prince did not appear and had no opportunity to 
cross-examine the physicia.n, thus enabling Ladd 1 s Lawyer to 
establish through the deposition that Ladd sustained damages 
in the amount of $20,000. Lawyer, for Ladd, a.gain appeared before 
the court, with the deposition filed, and without giving notice to 
Prince moved the court for judgment against Prince, based on the 
deposition. The court entered a judgment in favor of Ladd against 
Prince for $20,000 on January 3, 1971. Prince's bank account was 
attached on March 15, 1971, and needless to say, Prince became 
quite upset about the legal system and comes to you the next day 
and inquires as to what can be done for him. 
What should you advise? 
8. Sligo Insurance Company, a New York corporation with its 
incipal office in Ithaca, New York, executed, as surety, a pay-
t and performance bond with Colwell, a contractor and citizen 
Virginia, as principal. The bond ran to the City of Virginia 
a.ch, as obligee, on a contract of Colwell for building an · 
qitori'Um for the city, the same to be completed by September 15, 
O. Colwell encountered financial difficulties a.nd defaulted 
he partially completed contract in June of 1970, and as a 
lt, Sligo paid to the city $200,000 for its cost of completing 
contract and $100,000 to various subcontractors for work done 
e job for which Colwell had not made payment. 
ligo filed a complaint in the u. s. District Court for the 
n District of Virginia on October 1, 1970 against Colwell 
g, pursuant to the terms of the bond, reimbursement of the 
00 thus paid. After a hotly contested trial, on March 5, 
;the court ruled that Sligo should have paid only $150,000 
bond and judgment in that amount was entered for Sligo 
t Colwell for reimbursement. 
May 1, 1971, Colwell filed a complaint against Sligo in 
.s. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
~t count seeking a recovery of $12,000 on the ground that 
d overcharged this amount on the premium on the bond, 
ly paid, and the second count seeking a recovery of 
for damage to Colwell's reputation a.nd credit resulting 
der and malicious threats of ruin and disgrace made by 
.gents during June and July, 1970 in a.n attempt to get 
o post additional security on another job being done 
~ty of Petersburg, Virginia, on which Sligo was also 
filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the complaint 
d that Colwell was now precluded from asserting such 
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claims since he did not do so in the prior action. 
How should the court rule on the motion? 
9. While operating his automobile on the streets of the 
City of Portsmouth, Virginia, on January 13, 1971, Johnson was 
involved in a collision with a vehicle owned and operated by 
Simms. The damage to Johnson's vehicle was repaired for the 
sum of $150, and Johnson initiated an action in the Municipal 
Court of the City of Portsmouth seeking recovery of property 
damage to his vehicle in this amount. On February 12, 1971, 
the case was tried with both parties testifying, and the court 
entered judgment in favor of Johnson for $150. This judgment 
was paid by Simms' insurance carrier. At the time of the acci-
dent, Simms experienced only minor physical aches, which disap-
peared shortly thereafter, but several months later, it developed 
that the accident had caused his neck and back severe damage, and 
by May of 1971, Simms was partially paralyzed. On May 1, 1971, · 
imms brought an action at law in the Circuit Court of the City 
f Portsmouth to recover from Johnson the sum of $100,000 for 
ersonal injuries, alleging the same was caused by Johnson's 
egligence in the automobile accident of January 13, 1971. 
ohnson's attorney filed grounds of defense denying negligence, 
e case was tried, and the jury returned a verdict for $25,000 
favor of Simms, on which verdict judgment was entered. A 
nth later, but before this judgment was paid, Johnson was 
scussing the case with his attorney and, for the first time, 
tioned the $150 judgment which he had obtained in the Municipal 
rt for damage to his automobile. Johnson's attorney thereupon 
~ptly moved the court to set aside the judgment on the groUnd 
· the doctrine of res judica.ta applied as the prior action in 
Municipal Court between Johnson and Simms conclusively 
blished that Simms was negligent and Johnson was free from 
:;t and accordingly barred the cause of action subsequently 
ted by Simms against Johnson for personal injuries. On 
ent, Simms contended (a) that the doctrine of res judicata 
applicable because the property damage action had been in 
t not of record and, therefore, had no effect upon the 
al injury action in the court of record; (b) that res 
~ta was not applicable, in any event, as one action was for 
.ty damage and the other for personal injury; (c) that even · 
doctrine· of res judicata was applicable, the sa.me had been 
:,by Johnson failing to raise the point in the personal 
action of Simms; and (d) that the judgment was final and 
t be disturbed in any event. 




red Arnold is a resident of Clifton Forge, Virginia 
02 acres of timberland in Bummers County, West 
John Clifton is a resident of Salem, Virginia. Imnie-
ter cruising the timberland, and while still upon it, -
,, 
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on April 15, 1971 Arnold and Clifton entered into a valid written 
contract by which Arnold agreed to convey the land to Clifton for 
$20,520, the deed to be given and the purchase price to be paid 
on May 15, 1971. On May 15th, Clifton tendered to Arnold in the 
City of Clifton Forge the purchase price, but Arnold refused to 
execute and deliver the deed to the timberland. Shortly after 
leaving the office of Arnold, Clifton learned from a business 
associate of Arnold that Arnold was busily engaged in causing 
the cutting and removal of timber from the land. The next day 
Clifton brought a suit in equity against Arnold in the Circuit 
court of the City of Clifton Forge. Clifton's bill of complaint, 
after reciting the foregoing facts, sought relief on two grounds, 
(a) that the Court require Arnold to execute a deed conveying 
the timberland to Clifton on payment of the purchase price which 
was tendered into Court with the bill, and {b) that Arnold be 
enjoined against further removal of timber from the land. Arnold 
)1.a.s demurred to the bill of complaint on the following two grounds: 
{a) the Virginia Court has no jurisdiction to compel him to convey 
o Clifton the land si tua.ted in Summers County, West Virginia, and 
b) the Virginia Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin him against 
emoving timber from the West Virginia land. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of 
Arnold's demurrer? 
. ' 
FIRST DAY SECTION TWO 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - June 28-29, 1971 
1. Homer Hope, the owner of Red Bank, mailed a letter to 
Ralph Bookman, a Real Estate Broker in the City of Roanoke, 
Vi:r;-ginia. Following is the material portion of the letter: 
"I have owned Red Bank for many years and I am 
thinking of selling this property. I have never 
met you but a friend has advised that you are an 
industrious and honest real estate broker. I 
therefore employ you to find a purchaser for Red 
Bank a.ta price of $35,000." 
Ten days after receiving the letter, Bookman mailed the 
9llowing letter to Hope: 
"Acting pursuant to your recent letter requesting 
me to find a purchaser for Red Bank this is to 
advise that I have sold Red Bank to Joshua Redman 
for.$35,000. I enclose your copy of the contract 
of sale signed by Redman. Your name was signed 
to the contract by me as your agent, and I also 
signed my name to the contract as agent for you. 
As you will note the contract is very simple and 
merely provides that you agree to sell and Redman 
agrees to buy Red Bank for $35,000, the sale to 
.be consummated within a reasonable time from this 
'aate." 
ope, believing that he can obtain a much higher price for 
operty, consults you, showing you the two letters and 
ing whether he is obligated to convey Red Bank to Redman. 
What would you advise? 
Thomas owed White $3,500, which was due and payable 
, 1971. White owed Clark $3,500, which was due and payable 
, 1971. On June 8, 1971, White received a letter signed 
s stating, "If you will cancel my debt to you, in the 
f $3,500, I will pay, on the due date, the debt you owe 
nthe amount of $3,500. 11 On June 10, 1971, Thomas received 
.signed by White stating, "I received your letter and I 
the proposa.1 recorded therein. You may consider your 
e cancelled as of the date of this letter." On June 12, 
~e, needing money to pay his income taxes, made a demand 
s to pay him the $3,500 due on that date. 
omas consults his lawyer and inquires whether he is 
I' 
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obligated to pay the money demanded by White. 
What should the lawyer advise? 
(b) Clarlc, for the first time learning of what had transpired 
between Thomas and White, consults his lawyer and inquires against 
whom he may enforce his claim for $3:i500. 
What should the lawyer advise? 
3. Green and Brown were involved in an automobile collision 
on May 10, 1971 resulting in property damage to the vehicle of 
each. Two days following the collision Green said to Brown, 11 If 
you will give me $500 for the damage to my vehicle we will call 
it square. I have a repair estimate for $1200. 11 Brown stated 
·that this was agreeable to him and left. The next day Green again· 
appeared with the following written instrument and rPquested 
· rown to sign it: 
"I, Brown, do hereby agree to pay Green $500 in 
weekly payments of $25 each for damages to his car 
which occurred on May 10, 1971. 11 
After read:!-ng the instrument:i Brown signed and delivered it 
Green. One week after the delivery of the instrument:i the 
;e the· first payment was due, Brown went to Green's place of 
iness and said_, "I have come to pay you my first $25 payment, 11 
Green replied:i 11 I have ta.llrnd to my insurance adjuster about 
and he told me not to accept these payments." 
Green carried a $200 deductible collision po'licy with the 
.lty .Insurance Company, and pursuant to the provisions of the 
y Casualty Insurance Company had repaired Brown's automo-
~nd thereupon Casualty Insurance Company became subrogated 
e rights of Green against Brown. Casualty Insurance Company 
ced an action in Green's name against Brown to recover 
that being the amount paid by the Company on the $1200 
cost incurred in repairing Green's automobile. Brown 
ed by counsel and filed a plea of accord and satisfaction 
efense to the action. 
How should the Court rule on the plea? 
Rebecca Manning obtained an a mensa et thoro divorce 
.n- the Circuit Court of Giles County, Virginia against 
and, Joseph. After preliminary recitations, the decree 
as follows'. 
is, therefore, ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED 
.. the Complainant, Rebecca Manning, be and she 
by is, awarded a decree of divorce a mensa et 
d
from the Defendant, Joseph Manning, on the 
of desertion~ 
"There appearing nothing further remaining to 
be done in this cause the Clerk is directed to 
remove it from the Docket and to place it among 
causes ended, with the right in either party 
hereto to petition the Court to have the matter 
reinstated for such further proceedings as may 
be proper. 
"Entered--this 17th day of February, 1971. " 
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Shortly after the entry of this divorce decree Joseph died 
intestate seised and possessed of 300 acres of land purchased by 
him before the entry of the divorce decree. Joseph's only child, 
Jennie, has taken possession of the land, claiming that she is 
entitled to hold it free of any claim of dower by her mother, 
Rebecca. Rebecca consults you, inquiring .whet.her .. she is entitled 
to an assignment of dower in the land. t r (J -h d/\vC.·\.t ) / 
\ / , ' ~· ( •\ o.,l~~lr'-'!' / 
What would you advise? /"'!.:"~ ,c ?A) .... . 
I /) ~ 
5. Ray Roberts owned a 220 acre tract of land in Highland 
ounty on which he operated a saw mill with indifferent success. 
ong the rear of the tract wa.s located one of_ the last remaining 
ands of fine walnut timber. On May 1, 1971, while on a hunting 
ip in the region, Joe Stokes, a furniture manufacturer, saw 
e walnut trees and asked Roberts whether he would sell the 
ees. Roberts having replied that he would, he and Stokes on 
same day entered into a signed written contract whereby 
erts agreed to fell the trees, convert them to lumber of 
9ified dimensions, and stack the lumber in close proximity 
,t.he highway. On the signing of the contract Stokes paid 
rts the a.greed purchase price of $4,ooo. It was recited in 
contract that the trees became the property of Stokes on his 
nt of the price. The contract was not recorded by Stokes. 
·Y 7, 1971, and before the walnut trees had been felled, 
rank obtained and duly docketed a judgment against Roberts 
5,000. Crank has now learned of the contract between Roberts 
okes,, and has been told by Roberts that he intends to fell 
(,!e the walnut trees and to deliver them to Stokes. Crank. 
ou whether he may obtain an injunction against Roberts to 
t his doing so. 
What should you advise him? 
Mary Jones, while driving her husband's automobile with 
ission en route to attend a meeting of the Women's 
Auxiliary, collided with an automobile owned and operated 
Dent. Both ca.rs were severely damaged and Mary suffer~d 
and painful injuries. Dent sued Mary Jones in the Circuit 
,Augusta County, the County in which the accident occurred, 
X' for damages to his automobile. Mary appeared and filed 
.f defense and a counterclaim to recover damages for the 
e of her husband John. Dent filed a motion to dismiss-
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Mary's counterclaim on the ground that Mary had no standing to 
assert such counterclaim. 
How should the Court hold on Dent's motion? 
7. Tom Jones went to a cocktail party in the apartment of 
Herbert Smith on the evening of April 17, 1971. While Jones and 
Smith were having a drink with Bill Peck, discussion centered 
around the wrist watch being worn by Jones. Smith, admiring the 
watch, asked Jones where and at what price he had purchased it. 
Jones replied, "I bought it at Sterling Watch Shop about two years 
ago for somewhere in the neighborhood of $85, but I am not certain 
as to that." Smith then said, "Those fellows at Sterling are good 
people and always sell good watches. I'll buy that watch from 
ou." Jones replied, "It's a deal." The next morning Smith 
elephoned Jones and said he had changed his mind, and did not 
ish to buy the watch. Jones then sued Smith for damages for 
reach of contract. 
In defense, Smith has pleaded that he made no enforceable 
ntract with Jones (a) because the parties did not agree on the 
ice to be paid for-the watch, and (b) because the parties did 
t agree on the place and time of delivery of-the watch to Smith. 
Are either, or both, of these defenses good? 
8. Lucky Star Company manufactures, packs and sells cans of 
ed beef hash. It sold fifty cases of such packed cans tq 
way Distributing Company. That Company sold two of the cases 
pocers Market, Inc. which placed the cans from the cases on 
Shelves of its self-service store. Sarah Jones purchas.ed one 
e cans. The following evening she opened the can, heated 
ntents, and served a portion to her guest Eva Pryor. When 
yor began eating the hash, she bit down upon a stone which 
l the appearance of a piece of corned beef, and broke two 
teeth. She now comes to see you and tells you the foregoing 
She also states that she has learned that the stone was 
ed to get into the can of corned beef hash while it was . 
acked by Lucky Star Company. She then asks you what 
for relief she will have, tf any, in actions brought by 
inst (a) Lucky Star Company, (b) Richway Distributing 
., ( c) Grocers Market, Inc., and ( d) Sarah Jones. 
be your reply? 
·.While Paul Adams was driving along U. s. Highway No. 1 
a his head to look at a shapely young girl who was .dressed 
.ants·" While his attention was so diverted, Adams care-
~rved his automobile to the left and collided with an 
yehicle. This caused the vehicle so struck and Adams' 
0
1c~me to rest approximately eight feet apart. Sam Brown, V ng his automobile on the highway at a speed of 50 
Page Five 
miles per hour, saw the collision occur when he was 200 yards away._ 
Assuming that he could drive between the two vehicles, and not 
desiring to stop, Brown drove on and, in attempting to pass, 
collided with Adams' vehicle, breaking Adams' leg. Adams now 
comes to see you, tells you the foregoing facts, and adds that 
at the time his automobile was struck by that of Brown, he (Adams) 
was in such a dazed condition from the earlier collision that he 
could not avoid the injury caused by the collision between his car 
and that of Brown. He then asks whether you consider he has a 
good cause of action against Brown. 
What should your answer be? 
10. On July 4, 1965 Herbert Ross saw his long time acquaint-
ance Robert Miller steal a plastic doll worth $6 from a counter at 
the Hanover County Fair. Ross tried to persuade Miller to return 
it to the counter, but Miller only laughed and said "They'll never 
miss it." In February of 1971 Miller sold Ross a used automobile 
for $2500. Unknown to both Ross and Miller, the automobile had a 
defective front axle and as a result crashed and was badly damaged 
hen Ross was driving it on State Route No. 162. Ross thereafter 
endered the automobile back to Miller and demanded the return of 
is money. When Miller refused, Ross told him. that, if he did not 
ccept the proposition, he would have him prosecuted for the lar-
eny cormni tted -in 1965. Miller replied, "You can 1 t do that· to me. 
u know I have completely reformed, and that your having me 
osecuted would ruin my business and my reputation." Ross replieo 
have stated my proposal. Take it or leave it!" Having heard 
'thing from Miller within the next few days, Ross went to see 
e Commonwealth's Attorney, told him of the theft committed.by 
ler iri 1965, and asked that he have Miller prosecuted for 
ceny. This the Commonwealth's Attorney did. When the case 
heard, Miller, although admitting the theft, pleaded the five 
r statute of limitation provided for by § 19.1-8 of the Code 
irginia. His plea was sustained, and the proceeding was dis-
.ad. Miller has now brought an action against Ross in the 
.'U.it Court of Hanover County alleging malicious prosecution on 
part of Ross, and seeking damages of $50,000. Ross now asks 
hether he has a defense to the action. 
What should you advise himq 
